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 The article examines the importance of economic issues as deter-
minants of voting behavior in Croatia in the 2007 parliamentary elec-
tions. It seeks to establish whether there is an electoral division be-
tween winners and losers of transition in Croatia and whether the vot-
ers’ positions on economic issues are mainly shaped by their political 
affiliation, rather than their position in the social structure. Drawing 
upon survey data from the 2007 elections, it is argued here that eco-
nomic issues, notably the division between transitional winners and 
losers, do not play an important role in determining support for the 
two main political parties. The article also finds that the voters’ 
opinion on economic issues salient in recent elections and the voters’ 
evaluation of economic conditions are mostly structured by their af-
filiation to a particular political party. Finally, it concludes that eco-
nomic issues are less relevant in structuring the voting behavior in 
Croatia than the ones related to culture and history, and that, unless a 
major realignment takes place, what voter’s think about economic is-
sues could be largely conditioned by what parties they support say. 
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Introduction 
 From the early 1990s and into the 21st century, Croatian politics was 
dominated by political conflict lines drawn during the Second World War 
and the ensuing communist regime (see Šiber 1997, 1998). These conflict 
lines were drawn principally along the lines of family affiliation in the Sec-
ond World War, religion and closeness to the communist regime. Their 
content largely concerned the interpretation of history and the identity of the 
modern Croatian state and society (see Šiber 1998, Zakošek 1998, Zakošek 
and Čular 2004). For the most part, these political divisions overshadowed 
all other issues during the formative phase of democratic politics in Croatia. 
The advent of war merely accentuated these differences, and prevented the 
emergence of serious political divisions over issues that became prominent 
during transition, such as privatization and the establishment of market 
economy.  
 In a comparative context, Croatia would fit well in Kitschelt’s (1995, see 
also Tworzecki 2002) model of countries with a national accommodative 
model of communism. In such countries, which, according to Kitschelt, also 
include Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia, the communist regimes 
had to accommodate to some extent the social forces which have existed be-
fore communist rise to power and which relied on Catholic Church as an or-
ganization that was largely independent from the regime. While the commu-
nist regimes brought about industrialization and modernization which bene-
fited large segments of the population, they could not impose rigid dictator-
ship, and had to seek some sort of accommodation with social groups that 
could withstand social control imposed by the regime and maintain a certain 
level of autonomy from the regime. We may say that in Croatia these seg-
ments included groups close to the Catholic Church, but also groups associ-
ated with the losing side in the Second World War, which maintained, at 
least on ideological and symbolic level their separateness from the system.  
 While the communist regime in Yugoslavia took some measures to 
liberalize the economy and social life, it did not try to reconcile divisions 
brought about by the by the Second World War. Instead the regime tried to 
impose only one version of history and swept social divisions, sometimes 
even historical facts, under the carpet. The result was latent division in the 
Croatian society that did not become manifest until the period of transition. 
When multiparty system emerged, this division resurfaced and substantially 
influenced the structuring of the new party system and also shaped the vot-
ers’ views on issues of national identity, definition of citizenship, and the 
future course of Croatia’s development (Šiber 1997, 1998). 
 Throughout the period since independence in 1990, the issues of alloca-
tion of economic resources and governance of economy did not play an im-
portant role in Croatian politics. The only marginally salient economic issue 
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concerned the participation of foreign economic actors in the privatization 
and foreign ownership of economic resources within Croatia. But this issue 
was hardly independent, and it was by and large subsumed under a broader 
dimension marked by the divide between citizens with traditionalist and na-
tionalistic attitudes and those holding more cosmopolitan and integrationist 
attitudes. As such, economic attitudes played an insignificant role, both in 
the structuring of divisions between parties and in the shaping of ideological 
identities of Croatian voters (see Čular 1999 and Henjak 2005).  
 A decade later, however, the issue of statehood has slowly moved off the 
political agenda, and economic transition and privatization created new dis-
tributive outcomes in Croatian society. It can be expected that this would 
raised the salience of issues concerning the distribution of economic re-
sources and the future direction of economic development. The political sa-
lience of divisions over the definition of national identity has markedly de-
clined, at least between the mainstream parties, and a general consensus of 
established political elites has emerged concerning Croatia’s membership in 
the EU and NATO. The salience and polarization over cultural issues has not 
decline to the same extent, but the competition between parties over cultural 
issues has become less pronounced and in now waged from more moderate 
positions. 
 On the other hand, the public salience of governance issues – such as 
corruption, and economic issues – such as privatization and its distributive 
outcomes, visibly increased. The findings of the electoral survey conducted 
by the Zagreb Faculty of Political Science (FPZ) show that, prior to the 2003 
and 2007 elections, almost two thirds of respondents considered both, unem-
ployment and corruption, to be the most important issues. This is not to say 
that respondents in the 1995 and 2000 elections thought these issues were in-
significant, however the public salience of other issued considerably de-
clined raising the prominence of these two. 
  But it is not just that the salience of these issues increased. The 2007 
elections showed first signs of differences between main parties over various 
aspects of economic policy. HDZ advocated and implemented privatization 
of public companies through preferential sale to Croatian citizens during its 
2003-2007 term in office. SDP called for taxation of capital gains as a matter 
of just distribution of fiscal burden, arguing that the contribution to public 
expenditure of those who make very high incomes from capital gains is dis-
proportionately low given their ability to pay. Arguably, the scope of dis-
tributive effects of such policies would be small, but these differences do in-
dicate that parties were trying to deal in one way or another with rising sali-
ence of economic and governance issues. Moreover, SDP offered a substan-
tially different model of economic policy, in which the government would be 
more actively involved in reshaping of the economic structure and in up-
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grading of technological base of the economy. It also proposed several poli-
cies aimed at reshaping the distributive outcomes of privatization. At the 
same time, HSS advocated a significant increase of expenditure on rural de-
velopment, while HNS put forward what could generally be described as 
pro-entrepreneurial policy proposals.  
 We should not focus our attention solely on the positions advanced by 
parties in the recent campaign. Underneath the surface there exist a number 
of potential relevant issues, which emerged in the 1990s, and might structure 
political competition in Croatia in the near future. In the 1990s, Croatia 
moved from industrial economy to an economy that is highly dependent on 
services. A large number of industrial employees went through a very rough 
transition, which the state barely tried to manage and smooth out through so-
cial policies. Such changes produced sizable groups of transitional ‘losers’, 
but also not unsubstantial groups of transitional ‘winners’. And as the data 
from the 2003 and 2007 election survey demonstrate, concern about the out-
come of privatization, distributive outcomes of transition and effectiveness 
of governance are highly salient issues that could potentially structure politi-
cal competition in the future. 
 Starting from position outlined above, this study draws on general theo-
ries (notably those of Kitschelt, Tworzecki and Tucker), regarding the nature 
of political divisions in post-communist countries, and uses them to devise 
propositions to be tested in the Croatian context. But in part, the study is also 
explorative as it considers the role of economic and governance issues, the 
topic that was largely ignored in research of Croatian elections thus far. 
Therefore, the study aims to test several propositions derived from broader 
theoretical accounts and asses the importance of a number of factors which 
exhibited relatively low salience in Croatian politics so far in what appears 
to be a different competitive environment. The article strives to provide an-
swers to several questions.  
 Firstly, the study aims to assess the importance of economic and govern-
ance factors as determinants of vote choice relative to family history and re-
ligion, which previous studies found relevant. Secondly, it investigates 
whether there exist a political division between socioeconomic groups in 
Croatia, and how relevant it is compared to other political divisions. In more 
specific terms, the study aims to establish whether the better off social 
groups would be more likely to support HDZ as the party which was in gov-
ernment for the most part of the transition period, and whether worse off so-
cioeconomic groups would support SDP as the party which repeatedly 
promised to reverse the consequences of privatization. It would be interest-
ing to see if better off groups prefer the parties which were initially credited 
with policies aimed at modernization and opening up of the country, or the 
parties which implemented policies that largely affected the distributive out-
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comes of transition. The study also seeks to investigate whether there are 
differences between the voters of HDZ and of SDP in terms of their sensi-
tivity to the performance of their favored party when it is in office. It has 
been widely speculated, though very few studies actually investigated the 
matter, that HDZ voters are disciplined and loyal, and tend to stick to their 
party even if they are not satisfied with how it performs in government. On 
the other hand, as the argument goes, voters of the left, notably of SDP and 
parties close to SDP, tend to demobilize if they are dissatisfied with the per-
formance of their party in government. And, last but not least, the study in-
vestigates whether the voters vote in accordance with their distributive posi-
tion, or whether their preference for distributive policies is guided by their 
political affiliation. 
 In the first part of this article, I give an outline of the basic propositions 
to be tested; in the second part, I proceed to test these propositions against 
the data from the 2007 Croatian electoral survey conducted by FPZ. Finally, 
I present the results and briefly discuss their meaning and implications. 
Given the dominance of bipolar competition between HDZ and SDP over the 
political scene, I focus here only on differences between two main parties.  
 
Propositions 
 Economic transition and privatization created a new economic and distri-
butional reality in all post-communist countries. A number of authors 
(Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002, Tucker 2001, Rohrschneider and White-
field 2004, Fidumurc 2000) suggest that the new distributional outcomes 
relevant for these countries’ politics are generally characterized by a division 
between winners and losers of economic transition. Winners, in short, are 
those who benefited in various ways from the transitional process, who man-
aged to acquire assets in the privatization, and who have mobile skills or 
mobile assets which enable them to benefit from the market economy. In the 
group of winners we can also include those who managed to get privileged 
access to public or state-owned assets during the economic transition and to 
preserve privileged access to public spending or regulatory policy-making 
throughout the period. On the other hand, losers are those whose economic 
position worsened during the transition, who lost their job or income because 
their skills became obsolete, or do not have mobile skills or assets which 
would allow them to compete in an open market economy.  
 While concept of winners and losers in widely used, it is hard to identify 
members of these groups precisely in absence of sociological research about 
distributional outcomes of transition. In Croatia, up to this point, there are no 
studies that would enable us to map precisely the position or the strength of 
these groups, but we can safely say that such groups exist. Without having a 
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clear picture about who winners and losers are, this article is focusing on dif-
ferences in socioeconomic characteristics of respondents such as income, 
education, occupation and employment status. 
 The question is what political preferences can be assigned to these 
groups. Keeping aside all others factors we can say that, since HDZ was in 
power for most of the transition period, we could expect that worse off 
groups might be more likely to support the opposition parties. However, 
HDZ was also a party which presented itself, especially in the 1990s, pri-
marily as a party which defends national interests, including national eco-
nomic interests, and is opposed to policies which would allow stronger for-
eign economic influence. Moreover, during the 1990s HDZ government at-
tempted to offset public dissatisfaction with privatization, by offering exten-
sive social programs for war veterans and residents of war affected areas, as 
well as embarking on numerous bailouts of companies that were on the brink 
of bankruptcy. Obviously, we could expect all those policies to appeal to 
those with lower income and working class jobs. At the same time, the 
party’s nationalistic orientation and the protectionist and clientelistic policies 
may have had negative impacts on groups with high education and mobile 
skills and assets.  
 On the other hand, while one could expect SDP to be supported by those 
worse off, SDP-led government implemented an economic stabilization 
package that resulted in closing of numerous companies and an increase in 
unemployment, which mostly affected those with lower income and working 
class employment. But SDP also initiated the process of opening up the 
country and of modernizing the governance system, which undoubtedly ap-
pealed to those with mobile skills and resources.  
 Empirical analysis of electoral behavior in post-communist countries did 
not find anything resembling division between winners and losers to be po-
litically relevant. Attitudes toward economic issues and market economy are 
found to be important only in Czech republic (Kitschelt, Markowski, Mans-
feldova and Toka 1999, Evans and Whitefield 1998) as was socioeconomic 
position (class/occupation and income) (Gijstbers and Nieuwbeerta 2000, 
Mateju et al 1999). According to research conducted thus far Croatia in no 
exception in this sense (see Šiber 1998, Zakošek 1998, Zakošek and Čular 
2004). The issues related to economic transition and its outcomes did not 
play a significant role as determinants of electoral behavior in Croatia in 
previous elections. Because of this and because of the conditions described, 
it is not possible to form clear hypotheses regarding the impact of general 
outcome of economic transition on voting behavior in Croatia.  
 As for the second proposition, it is frequently said that voters of HDZ are 
more disciplined and less sensitive in their propensity to take part in elec-
tions than are voters of SDP and other parties. In particular, this would mean 
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that voters of HDZ would be more likely to stick to their party even if they 
were not satisfied with its performance in government, or for that matter 
with the performance of the economy, than voters of SDP and other parties 
who are likely to demobilize when they become dissatisfied with the per-
formance of their party. The aggregate results of the 2003 and 2007 elec-
tions, when compared to the 2000 elections, show that support for HDZ is 
much more resilient while support for SDP goes up and down as does sup-
port for other left parties1. Therefore, I expect that probability of voters sup-
porting HDZ does not differ significantly between those who are and those 
who are not satisfied with the economic situation when this party is in gov-
ernment. I also expect that the opposite will be the case with SDP, i.e., vot-
ers who are not satisfied with the economic situation are much less likely to 
vote for SDP when this party is in government.  
 The last proposition to be tested in this study is to what extent does the 
closeness of a voter to a particular political party affects his position on a 
newly-raised issue. The starting point is the issue of taxation, as one of the 
more salient issues in the recent electoral campaign, where positions of po-
litical parties were clear and visible to voters. It has been argued that voters’ 
identification with parties in Croatia is so strong that it affects the divisions 
between voters over policy issues (Čular 2003). In this case it would mean 
that voters’ position on taxation is not in fact conditioned by their actual ex-
posure to a particular type of tax or their distributive preferences, but rather, 
their preferences are in fact conditioned by their closeness to a particular po-
litical party. Therefore, voters who feel close to HDZ would oppose the 
SDP-proposed taxation of capital gains, while voters who feel close to SDP 
would support it regardless of whether its introduction would affect them. 
 
Method and data 
 The empirical part of this study is based on public-opinion data collected 
by the survey organized and implemented by FPZ immediately before the 
2007 parliamentary elections. The survey includes 1081 respondents se-
lected in a two stage sampling process. In the first stage eighty locations 
have been selected, controlling for the share of population in particular set-
tlement type, and in the second stage respondents were sampled within loca-
 
1 Support for SDP declined significantly between 2000 and 2003 and than went up in 2007. 
While in 2000 SDP was in coalition with HSLS, the total score of coalitions lead by both parties 
in 2003 was well below their combined score in 2000. Given that electoral fortunes of SDP and 
liberal parties are in reverse proportion over all these elections it is possible that large fraction 
of left voters shifts allegiances between elections. On the other hand HDZ won roughly the 
same number of votes in 2003 and 2007, and in 2000 weaker result can be attributed to party 
being worn out after a decade in power and being involved in numerous scandals. 
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tions. In test of the second proposition I also use the FPZ survey data from 
the 2003 elections, which included 1153 respondents sampled in a very 
similar two stage process. To maximize the number of cases available for 
analysis, which was significantly reduced by a large number of missing val-
ues on the household income variable, I used Amelia software for missing 
data in order to impute missing values for all variables except vote choice. 
For about one third of the respondents, however, no information about vote 
choice is available, and this information was not imputed, given the possi-
bility that respondents might not have actual preferences for any particular 
party. Imputation procedure created five datasets which were combined us-
ing procedure available in the Clarify module of the STATA software. 
 Since the recent political dynamics in Croatia resulted in electoral 
competition between two parties, and since most of proposition to be tested 
are really about differences between SDP and HDZ I will focus here exclu-
sively on the differences between these two parties. These two parties ac-
count for 2/3 of respondents which indicated their party preference. Given 
that more than 30% of respondents did not indicate which party they would 
vote for, the total number of cases available for analysis, including voters of 
HDZ and SDP is 442.  
 The three above-mentioned propositions are tested separately using dif-
ferent methods. The first one is tested using logistic regression, with vote 
choice for SDP or HDZ as the dependent variable. The independent vari-
ables include indicators of a respondent’s position in the economic structure, 
such as occupation, sector of employment, income, education, and status on 
the labor market. The principal indicators of the socioeconomic position are 
education and income, as these are the only available variables that measure 
possession or lack of possession of mobile skills and resources. Separate 
variables for the unemployed and the retired additionally measure exposure 
to a particular type of social risk. In addition, I use age, sex and residence as 
control variables. Indicators of religiosity and family political affiliation 
during the Second World War are also included, since these factors are 
found to be relevant determinants of electoral divisions in Croatia (Šiber 
1998, Zakošek 1998, Zakošek and Čular 2004). Their inclusion in the model 
could provide insight into the importance of economic divisions when com-
pared to divisions based on religion, culture and history. In the second 
model, in order to asses the role of economic issues and evaluations, I also 
added variables measuring attitudes toward taxation of assets, which was a 
prominent issue in the election campaign; measure of perception of exposure 
to such taxes, and an assessment of the overall and personal economic con-
ditions in comparison with those of four years ago. The detailed description 
of all variables is provided in the appendix.  
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 In testing the second proposition, I compared the impact of a respon-
dent’s perception of Croatia’s economic situation in general and the respon-
dent’s family economic situation in particular upon his voting for one of the 
two main parties, HDZ and SDP, in the 2003 and 2007 elections. 
 Given the expectation that HDZ voters are less sensitive than SDP voters 
to negative opinion about the economic situation when their party is in gov-
ernment, comparisons need to be drawn between points when SDP and HDZ 
were in power, in this case the 2003 and 2007 elections respectively. To this 
end I use multinomial regression, with vote choice for all parties or coali-
tions winning more than 4% of the national vote as a dependent variable. 
Multinomial regression is used to generate parameters for statistical simula-
tion of the impact that the change in evaluation of national economic condi-
tions and of the family economic situation has on the probability that a re-
spondent will vote for HDZ or SDP. Simulations are done with the Clarify 
module of STATA. Clarify takes parameters generated by statistical analysis 
and use them to simulate effects on a dependent variable when values of one 
or more independent variables are changed (see King, Tomz and Wittenberg 
2002). Clarify also transforms statistical parameters into easily interpretable 
real values, in this case the probability that a respondent will vote for HDZ 
or SDP. The multinomial regression model, used to generate parameters for 
simulation, includes indicators of sex, age, education, employment status, 
income, residence, religiosity and family history in the Second World War. 
Variables indicating occupation and sector of employment are not included, 
because the test of the first proposition did not find them to be significant, 
but also because the employment sector and occupation categories from the 
2007 survey could not be matched with data collected in the 2003 survey.  
 Simulations in the first step estimate the change in probability that a re-
spondent will vote for HDZ or SDP related to a gradual increase in the value 
of the variable indicating a respondent’s perception of the economic situa-
tion (in comparison with that of 4 years ago). All other variables in the 
model are set to their mean value in this simulation. In the second step, the 
identical procedure is used, except that this time, the simulation estimates 
the change in probability that a respondent will vote for HDZ or SDP related 
to a gradual increase in the value of the variable indicating a respondent’s 
perception of his family’s economic situation (in comparison with that of 4 
years ago). In this step all other variables are also set to their mean value.  
 The test of third proposition, which has to do with the impact of partisan 
affiliation on respondent’s support for taxation of income from assets, uses 
the OLS regression. The dependent variable is support for taxation of in-
come from property and capital. Independent variables in this model are: re-
spondent’s attitude toward HDZ and SDP, respondent’s assessment of 
whether the introduction of new taxes will affect respondent or his family, 
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and variables capturing respondent’s socioeconomic position namely sex, 
age, education, income, residence, labor market status and sector of em-
ployment. Given that the FPZ survey does not comprise variables measuring 
degree of identification with every political party, I use variables measuring 
whether respondent has positive or negative attitudes toward either political 
party instead. Since this study focuses primarily on divisions between HDZ 
and SDP, I use only variables which indicate whether the respondent has a 
positive or a negative attitude toward these two parties. 
 
Findings and Discussion  
 Regarding the first proposition, the analysis provides very little evidence 
of a division between groups with different socioeconomic status in Croatia. 
The results of logistic regression presented in Table 1 show that the voters of 
SDP are more educated and slightly more likely to be employed in the pri-
vate sector, while voters of HDZ are more likely to be unemployed, but 
those are the only differences between the two parties we find to be signifi-
cant. The lack of visible socioeconomic differences within the electorate of 
HDZ and SDP is not surprising, if we have in mind that neither party has an 
unambiguous record, with regard to both – policy statements and actual con-
duct when in government, which would position them as a credible repre-
sentative of either group.  
 In 2007, family history and religiosity reemerged as the strongest sources 
of difference between HDZ and SDP voters, pretty much in line with the 
findings of studies focusing on previous elections (Šiber 1998, Zakošek 
1998, Zakošek and Čular 2004).  
 In the second logistic regression, when variables measuring the economic 
evaluation and attitudes toward the introduction of capital gains taxation are 
added, we find that voters of SDP are much more likely to have a negative 
evaluation of the economic situation in comparison to that of four years ago, 
and are much more likely to support the introduction of proposed taxes. On 
the other hand, the views of HDZ voters are diametrically opposite. It is very 
unlikely that the vote choice of HDZ or SDP voters is structured by the 
evaluation of economic situation and the attitudes toward taxation. While 
causal link can not be established on the basis of analysis in this paper, it is 
more likely than not that attitudes of voters’ on both issues are conditioned 
by their affiliation or closeness to one or the other political party. In this 
case, it would mean that voters of SDP tend to support the introduction of 
taxes proposed by their preferred party not because they agree with this pro-
posal, but because they identify the issue with the party they feel close to. 
While the evidence for this claim is not conclusive and causal link can not be 
established on the basis of results of this study, given the clear dominance of 
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historical and cultural issues in structuring of political divisions and ideo-
logical and partisan affiliations, as well as almost total absence of economic 
factors and weak salience of economic issues in the whole period after 1990 
(see Šiber 1998, Zakošek 1998, Zakošek and Čular 2004, Čular 2003, Hen-
jak 2005) it is very hard to expect that attitudes toward taxation could form 
as an independent electoral division in 2007 elections. 
 
Table 1. Results of the regression analysis, with vote for HDZ or SDP as the 
dependent variable. The entries are logistic regression coefficients and stan-
dard errors. 
Model 1 Model 2  B S.E. B S.E. 
Sex  0.409* (0.255)  0.344 (0.323) 
Age  0.006 (0.010) -0.011 (0.013) 
Education  0.298** (0.139)  0.501*** (0.183) 
Income  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Religiosity -1.317*** (0.185) -1.286*** (0.227) 
     
Family affiliation in WW II     
NDH  Ref   Ref  
NOP  1.312*** (0.369)  1.098** (0.475) 
None  0.660** (0.320)  0.594 (0.418) 
     
Residence  0.067* (0.040)  0.041 (0.049) 
Unemployed -1.302** (0.566) -0.990 (0.728) 
Retired  0.030 (0.353)  0.502 (0.442) 
Budget-dependent sector -0.135 (0.608) -0.057 (0.828) 
Private sector  0.983* (0.609)  1.244 (0.819) 
     
Occupation     
Business and technical professionals -0.477 (0.603) -0.681 (0.754) 
Sociocultural professionals -0.150 (0.548) -0.016 (0.650) 
Technicians, clerks and administrators     Ref     Ref  
Self-employed   0.092 (0.575)  0.143 (0.704) 
Skilled workers -0.196 (0.416) -0.342 (0.515) 
Unskilled workers  0.039 (0.436) -0.068 (0.560) 
Others   1.200* (0.669)  1.043 (0.890) 
     
Exposure to SDP proposed taxes   -0.135 (0.116) 
Attitude toward SDP proposed taxes    0.741*** (0.123) 
Evaluation of the economic situation   -0.997*** (0.171) 
Change in economic situation of family    0.100 (0.173) 
Constant  3.105*** (1.217)  4.439*** (1.668) 
Nagelkerke R2  0.406   0.647  
 
 Apart from taxation, voters also seem to evaluate the economic situation 
in accordance with their partisan preferences. Those who prefer the party 
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which was in government up to the 2007 elections, in this case HDZ, tend to 
have a positive evaluation of the economic situation in comparison to that of 
four years ago, when their party was not in government. On the other hand, 
those who prefer the party that was in opposition at the time of the 2007 
elections, in this case SDP, tend to have a negative evaluation of the current 
economic situation in comparison with that of four years ago, when SDP 
was in government.  
 
Figure 1. Changes in probability that a respondent will vote for HDZ or SDP 
in 2007 and 2003 respectively, related to the increase of his satisfaction with 
the overall economic situation in comparison to that of four years ago. All 
entries are probabilities generated using statistical simulation based on pa-
rameters generated by multinomial logistic regression, with vote choice as a 
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Parties included in the analysis are HDZ, SDP, HNS, HSS and HSU. Since results for 
HNS; HSS and HSU are not substantively relevant for this analysis, the probabilities 
generated for these parties have been omitted. 
 
  I will now examine whether HDZ voters are less likely than SDP voters 
to abandon their party if they get dissatisfied with the economic conditions 
when their party is in government. According to the results of statistical 
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simulation shown in Figure 1, the evaluation of the national economic situa-
tion closely corresponds to party preferences. The probability of vote for 
HDZ or SDP in 2007 and 2003 is substantially different, depending on a re-
spondent’s comparison of the current economic condition with that of four 
years ago. In 2003, the probability that a respondent will support SDP de-
clines as the respondent becomes less satisfied with the state of the national 
economy compared to that of four years ago, while in 2007 a similar, but 
somewhat more pronounced effect is visible when it comes to HDZ.  
 
Figure 2. Changes in probability that a respondent will vote for HDZ or SDP 
in 2007 and 2003 respectively, related to the increase of his satisfaction with 
the economic situation of his family in comparison to that of four years ago. 
All entries are probabilities generated using statistical simulation based on 
parameters generated by multinomial logistic regression, with vote choice as 
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Parties included in the analysis are HDZ, SDP, HNS, HSS and HSU. Since results for 
HNS; HSS and HSU are not substantively relevant for this analysis, the probabilities 
generated for these parties have been omitted. 
 
 But when it comes to the effect of personal economic conditions com-
pared to those of four years ago, we see a considerable difference between 
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the 2003 and the 2007 elections. In 2007, when HDZ was the governing 
party, the probability of a respondent voting for HDZ as well as SDP 
changes only marginally as respondent opinion moves from the opinion that 
personal economic situation in 2003 was much better than in 2007 to the 
opinion that it was much worse. In 2003, however, when SDP was a gov-
erning party, the situation was quite different. The probability of voting for 
SDP increased by approximately 40% as respondent’s becomes more posi-
tive about the economic situation of his family compared to four years be-
fore. At the same time, the probability of voting for HDZ decreased by ap-
proximately 60%. 
 It appears that SDP voters are indeed more sensitive than voters of HDZ 
to the effects which their preferred party has on their own economic position 
when in government. But otherwise, we do not find clear evidence that HDZ 
voters are more willing to stick to their party irregardless of how it performs 
in government.  
 A closer look at the determinants of voter attitudes on one issue promi-
nent in the recent elections, which can clearly be attributed to one particular 
party, namely the taxation program proposed by SDP, suggest that closeness 
to either HDZ or SDP was the principal determinant of attitudes toward 
taxation. The OLS regression-based analysis (Table 2) shows that closeness 
to the two main parties, HDZ and SDP is the variable with the largest impact 
on attitudes toward the proposed taxation. Those who have a positive opin-
ion of SDP are more supportive of the introduction of taxes, while those who 
have a positive opinion of HDZ are more likely to oppose the introduction of 
new taxes. The only other significant effect indicates that respondents who 
expect to be affected by the proposed taxes are less likely to support their 
introduction. It seems therefore that, in large part, the opinion of respondents 
toward taxation is shaped by their closeness to parties proposing or opposing 
this particular program.  
 In this test the causal link can not be clearly established, however, the 
alternative interpretation stating that position toward taxation affects close-
ness toward parties in not very plausible given the context. The proposal in 
question was floated only shortly before recent elections and before that 
economic positions of parties were either not very clear or very clearly dif-
ferentiated. Also, in studies conducted thus far economic issues did not reg-
ister significant effects in studies of Croatian elections, while there is sub-
stantial evidence that attachment to a particular party is based on factors that 
were relevant at the time multiparty system was created and that it continued 
to be relevant in subsequent elections (see Šiber 1998, Zakošek 1998, Zako-
šek and Čular 2004, Čular 2003, Henjak 2005). 
 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIV, (2007.), No. 5, pp. 71–90 85 
                                                                                                                            
Table 2. Determinants of support for the introduction of capital gains and 
property taxation proposed by SDP. The entries are coefficients and standard 
errors generated by the OLS regression. 
 B S.E. 
Attitude toward HDZ  -0.214*** (0.033) 
Attitude toward SDP  0.251*** (0.037) 
Exposure to proposed taxes  -0.203*** (0.029) 
Education  0.024 (0.031) 
Age  0.007** (0.003) 
Sex  -0.115 (0.076) 
Income  0.000 (0.000) 
Private sector  -0.030 (0.075) 
Retired  -0.116 (0.115) 
Unemployed  -0.214* (0.121) 
Constant  2.918*** (0.284) 
Adjusted R2  0.186  
 
     ***=p<0.001, **=p<0.01, *=p<0.05, N=1081 
 
 On the basis of findings and interpretation of findings provided here, I 
would propose a general conclusion stating that, affiliation of voters with a 
particular party continues to be shaped by divisions’ salient at the time when 
partisan alignments are formed. In the case of Croatia, these divisions con-
cern attitudes toward history and religion, the role of tradition and the defi-
nition of national identity. Divisions among voters on these issues were 
politicisized in the 1990s, and led to the separation of Croatian voters into 
political blocs (see Čular 1999, Henjak 2005, Zakošek and Čular 2004). The 
stability of partisan alternatives representing these blocs was not over-
whelming; with the exception of largely stable electorate of HDZ. But it 
seems that there developed a more or less clear division between those sup-
porting HDZ and those supporting liberal and left-wing parties. It appears 
likely that, in the absence of a broader realignment and restructuring of the 
political space, this basic division between HDZ and left parties rooted in 
cultural and historical divisions will shape voters’ views on most of new po-
litical issues of low salience.  
 The finding that economic factors do not play a significant role in the 
structuring of political divisions in Croatia fits very well in the overall pic-
ture of political divisions in countries of Central and Eastern Europe which 
share similar historical legacies with Croatia. Numerous studies find that in 
most countries of CEE, socioeconomic and divisions based on economic is-
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sues are rather weak (see Kitschelt et al 1999, Gijstbers and Nieuwbeerta 
2000, Mateju et al 1999, Evans and Whitefield 1998, Toka and Henjak 
2007). In countries that belong to accommodative model of communism like 
Hungary, Poland or Slovakia, as in Croatia, political divisions, either elec-
toral or ideological, are rotating primarily around religion, tradition, identity 
and history (Kitschelt et al 1999, Toka 2004, Toka and Henjak 2007). These 
are largely shaped by the events taking place during communism and in pro-
communist period, while end of communism and the transition only allowed 
them to resurface without adding lot of new content. The only exception 
from this pattern in CEE is found in Czech republic, an early industrialized 
country with bureaucratic authoritarian type of communist regime, where 
economic issues are found to be in the root of electoral and ideological divi-
sions (Kitschelt et al 1999, Toka and Henjak 2007, Evans and Whitefield 
1998) and where socioeconomic divisions have visible impact on the struc-
turing of electoral divisions (Mateju et al 1999). 
 
Conclusion 
 Based on the analysis conducted in this study, it appears that socioeco-
nomic cleavage, either on sociostructural or on attitudinal level is not present 
in Croatia. The reason for this might be the fact that transitional societies do 
not have homogenous socioeconomic groups. Better off groups, include both 
those in possession of skills and assets allowing them to compete in market 
economy, and those who benefited from the privatization process due to 
their close relations with the political elite that was in control of the process. 
While the former group could be expected to support reform-oriented poli-
cies aimed at strengthening of the market economy and the rule of law, the 
latter group members would prefer policies that would keep them in control 
of economic resources and protect their position on the domestic market. On 
the losing side, we have both those whose dissatisfaction with government 
policies was ameliorated by their inclusion in what could essentially be de-
scribed as clientelistic social-security schemes, and those who were not 
compensated by such policies. At this point, we do not have the data with 
sufficiently precise measurement to test this proposition. Consequently, our 
conclusion is based on an informed speculation. Still, when additional data 
becomes available, this could be a fruitful line of research.  
 Another tentative finding emerging from this study is that attitudes to-
ward the economic issue of taxation, which was salient in the 2007 elections, 
as well as the voters’ evaluation of economic conditions in comparison with 
those at the time of the previous elections, were largely conditioned by the 
respondents’ closeness to a particular political party. According to most pre-
vious studies of Croatian electoral politics, the sources of political closeness 
are to be found in attitudes toward history, religion, and the definition of na-
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tional identity and the identity of post-transitional Croatia. Until the entry of 
new cohorts alters the character of the Croatian electorate, or until a recon-
figuration of political divisions takes place, we can expect to see continued 
low salience of economic issues in the Croatian elections. It is also likely 
that the voters’ position on economic issues will be determined primarily by 
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables  
SEX: Sex of a respondent coded as 1 for female and 0 for male. 
AGE: Age of a respondent in years. 
EDUCATION: Respondents highest completed level of education. 
INCOME: Household income measured in kunas. 
RELIGIOSITY: Respondent attitude toward the religion, higher value mark 
higher level of religiosity. 
POSITION OF FAMILY IN SECOND WORLD WAR: Variable distin-
guishing between those with families on the side of NDH (1), NOP (2) and 
mixed or non aligned family history (3). 
RESIDENCE: Size of respondent locality. 
UNEMPLOYED: Dummy variable for unemployed respondents. 
RETIRED: Dummy variable for retired respondents. 
BUDGET DEPENDENT SECTOR: Variable coded as 0 and 1 and indicat-
ing if respondent sector of employment is dependent on government budget. 
Sectors included are public administration, public services, public companies 
and transport and construction. 
PRIVATE SECTOR: Variable indicating if respondent is employed in the 
market sector includes industry, trade and services and business services. 
OCCUPATION: Variable indicating respondent occupation, differentiating 
between business and technical professionals, sociocultural professionals, 
technicians, clerks and administrators, self-employed, skilled workers, un-
skilled workers and others. 
EXPOSURE TO PROPOSED TAXES: Measures respondent perception 
about whether respondent or hers household is likely to be affected by pro-
posed capital gain and property taxes and to what extent (higher values indi-
cate higher perceived exposure). 
ATTITUDES TOWARD PROPOSED TAXES: Measures whether and to 
what extent respondent supports proposed taxes (higher values indicate 
higher support). 
EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC SITUATION: Measure how respondent 
perceives economic situation in comparison to that of four years ago (higher 
values indicate negative evaluation). 
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EVALUATION OF FAMILY ECONOMIC SITUATION: Measure how re-
spondent perceives economic situation of his family in comparison to that of 
four years ago (higher values indicate negative evaluation). 
ATTITUDE TOWARD HDZ: Variable measures whether respondent has 
positive or negative opinion about HDZ (higher values indicate positive 
evaluation). 
ATTITUDE TOWARD SDP: Variable measures whether respondent has 
positive or negative opinion about SDP (higher values indicate positive 
evaluation). 
VOTE CHOICE: Dependent variable, in logistic regression coded as 0 if re-
spondent indicated preference for HDZ and 1 if respondent indicated prefer-
ence for SDP. In multinomial regression it also includes values if respondent 
indicated preference for HSS, HNS and HSU. 
 
